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Amazonian masters in theory and in practice.
About Luiz Costa’s The owners of kinship. 
Asymmetrical relations in indigenous Amazonia 
(Hau Books, Chicago, 2017)
Olivier AllArd *
Luiz Costa has offered us an important and fascinating book on the topic of 
ownership in lowland South America (aka “Amazonia”), rich with ethnographic 
details, astute interpretations, and bold theorization. While deeply impressed 
by Costa’s work and convinced by many of his arguments, I also found myself 
disagreeing with as many other interpretations or developments he makes—some 
of which have to do with the purpose and nature of our work as anthropolo-
gists. I want to acknowledge this fact from the beginning, rather than disguise 
my criticism under polite compliments, for I write this commentary in order 
to prompt debates about Amazonian relations of mastery, as well as about the 
type of anthropological knowledge produced in Amazonia.
While Amazonia has long been equated with resolute equality and horizontal 
relationships, there is a growing body of scholarship on the issue of mastery or 
ownership (which would translate in French as “maîtres,” and “maîtrise,” in 
Portuguese as “donos,” in Spanish as “dueños,” etc.), and more generally on 
asymmetrical relationships. It is these debates that this book seeks to advance. 
The recognition of the pervasiveness and cross-cutting nature of those relation-
ships can be traced back to Erikson (1987) on pet-keeping and Menget (1988) 
on adoption, but we had to wait until the 2000s for works on the question to 
flourish, with the superb synthesis by Fausto (2008) and the stimulating work 
on pre-Columbian slavery by Santos-Granero (2009), as well as a number 
of new ethnographies (listed by Costa, p. 6, n. 2; some are quoted at length 
by Fausto 2013). Within this discussion largely conducted by closely related 
anthropologists, Costa’s book will certainly appear and remain as a landmark, 
taking this question as an exclusive point of entry into the ethnography. It is 
also designed as a trial and assessment of Fausto’s model, which Costa sub-
jects to a thorough ethnographic investigation based on his fieldwork with the 
Kanamari of Southwestern Amazonia in Brazil between 2002 and 2006, with 
an additional visit in 2015. In Fausto’s (1999) original formulation, mastery 
* EHESS, Laboratoire d’anthropologie sociale [olivier.allard@ehess.fr].
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(as it is often translated) or ownership (as Costa prefers) represents a key rela-
tionship that bridges conflicting understanding of Amazonian social life: it is 
the missing link between predation (foregrounded by Viveiros de Castro and 
others) and commensality (highlighted by Overing and others);1 it enables the 
conversion of affinity into consanguinity through the familiarization of cap-
tives (in Fausto’s [1999] original formulation), and more generally represents 
a “cosmological operator” that accounts for the dynamic nature of Amazonian 
life and the absorption of new events into given patterns (Fausto 2008). Costa 
confirms Fausto’s model, while enriching it as the same time, insofar as he 
illustrates “how the Kanamari act to ensure that predation becomes feeding 
and that feeding becomes kinship” (p. 230).
The originality of Costa’s contribution lies in the detailed analysis of how pre-
dation relates to kinship, following a path that might not be the one expected—
predation becomes more and more present in a text that starts with feeding. 
Moreover, this is also a very particular take on the topic of mastery or ownership, 
insofar as Costa explicitly presents his work as the study of a “concept” (p. 223), 
and therefore takes as a starting point some key Kanamari expressions and words 
that he discusses at length. The first and most important of these, “-warah,” 
which refers primarily to the owner of something or someone (“X-warah” is 
“the owner of X”), is generally translated by Costa as “body-owner” (a point 
I will discuss in due course), and allows a number of possible reciprocal terms 
(e.g. pet, child, or just a possessive mark). Privileging this key term is probably 
one reason why, as Costa acknowledges at the beginning of his book (p. 20), 
he largely describes those asymmetrical relationships from the master’s point 
of view, whereas other ethnographies have explored how they look like from 
the subordinate’s perspective.2 This focus on concepts is also in line with the 
position promoted by Hau, the publisher of the book, which claims as anthro-
pology’s specific mission the production of concepts out of ethnography (see 
Da Col and Graeber 2011, p. viii). While Costa does not explicitly refer to this 
project, his analysis of Kanamari concepts of ownership, largely drawn from 
the complex translation of “-warah” and its uses, would certainly fit into it. 
Most of my dissatisfactions with the book relate to this stress on conceptual 
novelty and the placing of ethnography in its service. As I will discuss below, 
I am sceptical of Costa’s central concept of the “body-owner” and of the lexi-
cal and morphological analysis from which it is derived, and I will therefore 
essentially try to formulate an internal critique.
1. This distinction of various “analytical styles in contemporary studies of Amazonian 
societies” dates from Viveiros de Castro (1996, p. 188). From the original tripartite divi-
sion, it has often been reduced to a binary opposition between French-Brazilian alterity 
and British intimacy.
2. See, for instance, Bonilla (2005) or Walker (2012).
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Feeding animals and spirits
One of Costa’s great insights is to foreground a practice already well docu-
mented in Amazonian ethnology, but which he submits to further analysis: 
pet-keeping. Costa emphasizes its importance among the Kanamari and details 
its concrete workings. Pet-keeping originates in the feeding of a wild animal—
usually a youngling whose parents have been killed while hunting—, which 
its new owner nurtures in order to “familiarize” it. This logic might not be a 
surprise to readers familiar with the region, but the Kanamari are strikingly 
articulate about it. As Costa puts it, they are well aware that, at least in this 
situation: “Feeding is not an act that cancels out a previously existing need 
(i.e., hunger), but one that instills or perpetuates a need” (p. 26). In creating a 
need for the feeder, it turns him or her into an owner (although, as Costa will 
note, ownership can also exist without nurture). Pets, like children, are being 
“caused to grow” (p. 32), precisely because they are fed, but the crucial differ-
ence is that owners try to preserve the juvenile traits of their pets, as if those 
pets were to remain children forever: they never become autonomous and do 
not reproduce in captivity. And yet pets age, and as they age they become less 
dependent and more aggressive, especially towards anyone but their feeder. So 
what are people to do with them? I found Costa’s discussion of this paradox, 
as well as the various possible responses of the Kanamari, fascinating. Some 
choose to give or exchange old pets with whites or other Amerindians, know-
ing that they might be killed and eaten, while others try to cope with them. In 
one instance some teenagers killed and disposed of a couple of otters that had 
become hostile to any visitors, in another a woolly monkey was given a separate 
hammock in a designated place in the household (p. 55-56).
Pet-keeping is an extreme (or maybe pure?) form of ownership, because it is 
probably the most one-sided: as Costa reminds us throughout the book, using 
it as a standard against which to compare other forms of ownership, mutual-
ity can never be achieved with pets, since they can never become producers 
of food nor commensals. This is one instance where the distinction between 
(unilateral) feeding and (reciprocal) commensality becomes crucial, and I think 
it should encourage the investigation of other cases where feeding does not 
imply (and sometimes precludes) commensality, a difference which stems from 
the concrete way in which food is provided. To give one contrastive example, 
Jabin (2016, p. 468-476) discusses the feeding of Yuqui slaves who nonethe-
less never become their masters’ relatives (what he calls “heterotrophy”). 
In spite of this asymmetry, Kanamari pets can in some cases (but certainly not 
all) be “loved” by their owner, which would imply a reciprocal feeling: Costa 
mentions the possibility of funerary laments for a deceased pet, and gives the 
moving example of a man who advises against showing his wife a picture of 
herself with her late pet woolly monkey, since it would reignite her grief (p. 40). 
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Both behaviours are so typical of reactions to the death of (human) relatives in 
lowland South America that I was struck by their occurrence in this context.
The relationship with shamanic (pet) spirits is very similar to that with (animal) 
pets—an almost systematic connexion in Amazonia—, but it is also slightly 
more ambivalent. Indeed, what is familiarized is not a helpless youngling, 
whose parents have been killed, but a powerful and potentially dangerous 
being. Feeding is therefore not a means of making them grow, but rather an 
“educative measure” (p. 51), a way of appeasing them. Among the Kanamari, 
such spirits would primarily be the “jaguar hearts” of dead shamans (p. 43), 
which a novice shaman has to capture in order to become fully qualified. 
Interestingly, this predatory step follows an earlier benevolent one, during 
which a shaman willingly places a “dyohko” (shamanic substance or spirit) in 
a young boy’s flesh, so that it will “grow inside with him” and later enable him 
to acquire his own auxiliary spirits (p. 42). To illustrate how those different 
relations are connected, Costa gives the fascinating example of a shaman who 
told him how he had familiarized the “jaguar heart” of his late father-in-law, 
before the pouch where he had stored it was stolen, along with the pet-spirit 
(p. 44-48)! I was struck by the fact that you could “steal” an auxiliary spirit in 
such a way, merely by snatching its material container and feeding it properly, 
since it disproves my earlier assumption that shamanic spirits could only be 
seduced away (Vienne and Allard 2005, p. 131). Costa uses this narrative to 
show that the former father-in-law had to be turned into an enemy in order 
to be subsequently familiarized: it was not possible to familiarize his “heart” 
directly. However, he had already become a danger to his former kin, and it 
was therefore necessary to go through this process. And yet, even when it 
succeeds, the shamanic spirit is kin to the shaman but not to the shaman’s own 
relatives (p. 48): this widespread idea explains the common moral ambivalence 
of shamans themselves.
The discussion of pets and shamanic spirits also provides a first approximation 
of the link between feeding and predation. Pets are not eaten by their owner, in 
the same way that spirits do not prey on those who feed them (p. 53). Indeed, 
an action often given as a typical example of feeding is for a woman to chew 
some food and place it in the mouth of her pet (p. 28), precisely what Surrallés 
(2003, p. 45-46) had described as “anti-predation” in his study of the Jivaroan 
Candoshi. But concomitantly, both pet-keeping and shamanism show that 
ownership originates in predation and must also curb it: this is a question that 
reappears throughout Costa’s book and is the focus of its final chapter.
As often as it is compared to shamanism, pet-keeping is contrasted to domes-
tication and the treatment of domesticated animals (or livestock). According 
to the Kanamari, domesticated animals are “the small animals of the whites” 
(p. 81), that is to say, animals essentially associated with them, and Costa spells 
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out very clearly the scandal, from a Kanamari point of view, of eating what you 
feed, since it represents a predatory form of kinship (p. 90). But the Kanamari 
precisely try to circumvent this problem. On the one hand, they do not actually 
feed chickens and pigs, but rather let them eat by themselves. On the other hand, 
they raise them for the white inhabitants of the neighbouring town of Atalaia 
do Norte, who are their real owners (p. 83-85). Kanamari people merely “have” 
livestock without being their “owners” (p. 83)—a distinction I will return to—, 
or are said to “act as their caretakers” (p. 85). Costa sees this pattern of rais-
ing animals for white people as a transformation of the “aviamento” system, 
typical of rubber extraction in the area (and known as “habilitación” in most 
Spanish-speaking Amazonia): when work only takes place as the compensa-
tion for (or reimbursement of) goods that have previously been advanced, then 
“everything that is produced already belongs to others—and will be consumed 
by others” (p. 95). This leads him to the suggestive idea that it is a way for the 
Kanamari not only to avoid doing what they would consider scandalous, but 
also to spare local whites the infamy of engaging in what Kanamari consider 
immoral behaviour: by raising livestock for white people, they spare the latter 
having to eat their pets or “children” (p. 206).
Kinship and history in Brazilian Amazonia
Costa then turns to human children, who stand out against the backdrop of 
children that never become adults (animal pets), of pets that are kin only to 
their owner (shamanic spirits), and of children that some people eat (livestock, 
and specifically chickens owned by white people). Chapter 3, “On the child’s 
blood,” constitutes a wonderful discussion of the idea that Amazonians “make 
kin out of others” (Vilaça 2002). Indeed, the Kanamari stress the otherness 
of the newborn: a woman told Costa that becoming pregnant was like being 
“grabbed” by “another” (p. 103), couvade prescriptions and prohibitions are 
meant to protect not the child but rather its parents and their close relatives 
(p. 110), and there is an actual fear of the child to be born, which finds a solution 
in contraception (although, as a vulgar positivist, I was somewhat surprised 
that Costa described those practices as if the insertion of a shamanic spirit did 
actually render women barren, p. 104-106). Babies, like enemies, have “new 
blood,” and the couvade is therefore “a metaphorical posthomicide seclusion” 
rather than the other way around, as most anthropologists have weighted it 
(p. 119). With respect to kinship, what matters is not birth itself, but rather the 
baby’s first suckle: it establishes the mother-child relationship as a feeding 
relationship, which is why the mother is said to be the owner (-warah) of her 
child (p. 121-122). Food is here salient without being said to transform bodily 
substance and therefore to create a “substantial” bond between people (which 
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is also true of blood), so that feeding and commensality must rather be seen as 
“means of engaging others” (p. 17).3
Such an idea might remind us of Gow’s (1991) ethnography of the Peruvian 
Piro (Yine), and Costa conducts a fascinating dialogue with Gow, here as in a 
few other places, although the affective dimension of relationships seems less 
central in the Kanamari material. Among the Kanamari as among the Piro, 
fosterage is foregrounded and glossed as “to cause to grow” (p. 129). This is 
indeed a very widespread idiom, which I also encountered among the Venezuelan 
Warao with whom I did fieldwork: they commonly talk of their foster child 
as he or she “who grew up in my hands,” and conversely of a foster parent as 
he or she “in whose hands so-and-so grew up.” Kanamari foster parents are 
usually older people, to whom a grandchild is entrusted so that they may keep 
“making themselves body-owners” instead of having a “body-owner,” as if it 
were radically exclusive (p. 133-134). More simply, it could probably be said 
that fosterage takes place so that older people can keep on caring for someone. 
However, this seems to be a rather hypothetical deduction made by Costa, and 
in some other places, people would merely justify fosterage by saying that it is 
sad to remain alone (e.g. Peluso and Boster 2002, p. 142). What is, however, 
striking is that, among the Kanamari, a foster mother is called the “owner” of her 
foster child but never his or her “mother”: terms for father and mother apply to 
only one individual each (the mother being the first woman the child suckled), 
and are not transferred to foster parents (p. 129, 133). This is rather unusual in 
the ethnographic record at large.4 According to Costa, this is so because there 
would simply be no foster parents without a birth/suckling mother, and the 
former therefore never eclipses the latter. He has a very nice way of summing 
up his argument: “Since every child is an enemy, every birth is an adoption by 
capture, and every relation of fosterage celebrates the existence of the kinship 
relations that successfully defused the threat posed by birth-capture” (p. 135).
Kinsfolk, before they can engage in reciprocal relations of love and care, need 
to have been (unilaterally) fed. If, from a personal point of view, it means having 
parents, from a collective point of view it means having a chief. Kanamari chiefs, 
defined as “owners of people,” are indeed the precondition of kinship: “[T]here 
are no settlements without chiefs and no kinship without settlement” (p. 226). 
This is also why kinsfolk who inhabit the same settlement do not represent “a lot 
3. See also Allard (2006, p. 452-454) for a discussion (and a critique) of the role granted 
to bodily substance in kinship studies, especially in Amazonia.
4. Costa acknowledges that children might call the woman who has fostered them “mother” 
in address, if not in reference (p. 130), but downplays this fact. It is difficult to ascertain 
whether the privilege given to reference terms comes from the Kanamari or from Costa; 
address terms seem to be crucial among the Piro, and it is something that the Warao would 
systematically emphasize.
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of people,” but rather a “cluster” with an intrinsic unity—provided by chiefs—, 
and in the past they also formed endogamous subgroups. Kanamari chiefs are 
feeders, insofar as they make commensality possible: in practice, it was at a 
chief’s initiative that a large garden was cleared before being divided into family 
subplots (and it was therefore his garden), and it was at his house that game 
was butchered and redistributed (p. 151). Couched in a different idiom, Costa’s 
analysis nonetheless fits well with previous descriptions of the Amazonian chief 
as a leader or initiator, “he who begins” and whom others follow (Viveiros de 
Castro 1992, p. 110; Rivière 1984, p. 72-73, see also Costa, p. 73, about “fol-
lowing”). Yet this is essentially what took place in former times. I was a bit 
surprised that, in spite of noting that we know “only how the Kanamari claim 
that [subgroups] operated” in the past (p. 178, n. 33), Costa devoted so much 
effort to the reconstruction of pre-contact social organization and the role of 
chiefs within it—as if this ideal past was really the stable system that had been 
destabilized by white Brazilian colonizers and later by state agents.5 However, 
it is true that this system of named endogamous subgroups (which is not unique 
in Southwestern Amazonia) is striking, and that it enables Costa to introduce 
some elements that will be useful to his subsequent analyses: according to 
Kanamari descriptions, the chief used to be the public face of the subgroup, 
especially on the occasion of rituals that took place between people who were 
neither enemies nor kin. Drawing on previous discussions, Costa stresses that 
guests were not fed by their hosts, but rather provided with “antifoods” that made 
them drunk (p. 164): this meant an avoidance of commensality between hosts 
and guests, contrary to what has been described for other Amazonians. Hosts 
and guests were involved in “exchange,” that is to say, the barter of various 
things (p. 167), which is a way of connecting people but also of keeping them 
distinct (“relations that separate,” as Strathern [1988] would say).
I found the analysis of 20th and 21st century changes much more interesting 
than the reconstruction of an ideal past. Contrary to what happened in other 
parts of lowland South America, rubber bosses did not replace chiefs nor did 
they become “owners.” When they reached the area, in the 1920s, the high 
prices of rubber that had marked boom years had already collapsed and bosses 
did not have the resources to maintain their indigenous clients. This triggered a 
dispersal of the Kanamari population, who engaged in multiple debt-relationships 
at the same time, contrary to the centripetal effect that extractive activities had 
on the Piro, for instance, who were united by coresidence with the same boss 
5. Whereas Costa describes the mixing of subgroups as a result of rubber extraction, which 
took place in the area in the late 1920s (p. 169), he also quotes French missionary Tastevin 
as saying that the institution of subgroups was “in full disorganization” (p. 138)—and 
Tastevin lived with the Kanamari between 1909 and 1926, that is to say, before the direct 
involvement of Kanamari people in rubber extraction.
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(p. 169-172). Conversely, when the first Fundação Nacional do Índio (Funai) 
representative arrived in 1972, the Brazilian institution in charge of Amerindian 
people became a hyper-feeder and owner, actually the only owner ever to unite 
all Kanamari people, therefore creating “a world with a surfeit of kinship” 
(p. 173). Funai agents did so by generously providing them with food and 
commodities, and Costa describes how Funai has made local chiefs redundant, 
by swallowing up the feeding function (p. 181). It is striking that Funai is not 
identified with particular local employees; rather it serves as a blanket category 
for all Brazilian institutions, especially those that are powerful and hierarchical, 
and whose power ultimately originates from Brasilia (p. 178-180).
Finally, Costa attempts to relate historical changes to the Kanamari cosmopo-
litical order that he mostly infers from mythical narratives. It is also for him a 
way of going back to the question of predation and feeding that he had tackled 
earlier, in order to argue that predation is a basic parameter of the world, and 
that kinship must be extracted from this immanent violence (p. 224). This state-
ment is unlikely to surprise specialists of Amazonia, and Costa underlines how 
it fits into the classical debate between Viveiros de Castro and Overing, if we 
may keep using them as metonyms for whole bodies of scholarship (p. 229). 
Costa more precisely argues that feeding, while being antithetical to predation, 
also originates in predation from a structural point of view, and not just from 
the individual perspective of the spirit that is captured or of the pet whose 
parents have been killed (p. 191). Moreover, feeding, while being a form of 
protection, also exposes the fed to predation (p. 208). Costa substantiates these 
claims by telling us that, according to mythic narratives, jaguars were originally 
the owners of everything, and yet they did not feed what they owned—they 
merely controlled it, and sometimes fed on it. They were made to relinquish this 
ownership, but more importantly their corpse, as they died, became a source 
of food that attracted the animals they used to control (p. 190-193). It shows 
very clearly that the owner was what unified or concentrated a population: as 
their owner dies, fish disperse and animals become distinct, and only gather 
again occasionally when they feed on their former master’s corpse. Yet does 
becoming itself food turn the jaguar into a feeder? It seemed to me that Costa 
is over-interpreting his data with such a statement (p. 192), so as to phrase 
all relations exclusively in terms of feeding and ownership.6 It is actually 
6. The idea of the jaguar as feeder reappears in his analysis of the “jaguar ritual”: “The 
Jaguar, magically captured by the Kanamari and made drunk from the beer, thus transforms 
game into easy prey during the ritual, replicating the same transformation that it achieves in 
the myths of the Master of Fish and Master of Game” (p. 219). However, contrary to what 
is stated in the last part of the quote, I am strongly convinced that feeding humans with 
its pets is not the same as becoming food for its pets (even when it is rephrased as feeding 
them with its own corpse). Moreover, Costa states on several occasion that fish originally 
constituted the body of (or “were the body parts of”) the Master of Fish (e.g. p. 191, p. 193; 
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concentration, which might be occasioned by feeding opportunities, which 
exposes people and animals to predation, and dispersal is the usual response 
to attacks (p. 208). This is a rather common pattern across the world, and it is 
also interesting to note that it could fit into a completely different theoretical 
framework (e.g. Scott 2009).
Concepts and practices
I have been forced to leave out many interesting details and insightful inter-
pretations, but readers who know the work of Luiz Costa will also have noted 
that I have barely mentioned a question that is rather prominent in his book—the 
concept of “-warah” and its semantic range, and what can be inferred from 
it. I have largely ignored it until now for two reasons. First, I wanted to show 
that I consider it to be in fact largely irrelevant to many very convincing argu-
ments advanced by Costa, which could therefore be introduced without much 
reference to the concept. Second, I would like to articulate in a synthetic way 
my reservations and disagreements with Costa, which concern both the type of 
data he foregrounds and the kind of knowledge he wants to produce with it. In 
a word, I think that Costa gives too much importance to semantic distinctions 
(as if thought and language were strictly equivalent), sometimes relies on dubi-
ous etymologies or draws very hypothetical conclusions from the analysis of 
linguistic constructions, and that it leads him (in spite of some of his claims to 
the contrary) to portray “ownership” (or asymmetrical relations) in an overly 
rigid and static way—as if it were a fixed condition rather than a contextual 
relation and a matter of practice.
Let us go back to what is a cornerstone of Costa’s analysis: “-warah,” as 
I mentioned, can essentially be translated as the owner in relation to what is 
owned, the torso in relation to limbs or extremities, the trunk of a tree in relation 
to its branches or seeds, the main course of a river in relation to its tributaries, 
etc., and it is always preceded by what is owned or subordinate (“X-warah” 
meaning “owner of X”) (p. 60-64). Costa has chosen to translate it as “body-
owner” in order to draw attention to the fact that it has no transparent translation 
into English or other European languages. This choice was also influenced by 
a crucial misunderstanding with which he opens the book: while trying to ask 
“how were the bodies of long-ago chiefs?,” he fails to find an understandable 
translation and discovers that both “bodies” and “chiefs” are translated by the 
same word (-warah) when his interlocutor tells him in Portuguese that: “our 
body is our owner and our chief” (p. 1-2). This is indeed a remarkable fact, yet 
after reading the whole book I felt that the lapidary remark of Costa’s informant 
2010, p. 185), but it never appears explicitly in his translation of the myth, according to 
which the jaguar “gathers” or “hoarded” the fish (p. 191-192).
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was intended to solve a problem of vocabulary rather than as a comment on 
the bodily and political order of things. The translation of “-warah” as “body-
owner” in fact did not strike me as felicitous, first because the term of “body” 
carries some ambiguity, and second because the choice of a stable composite 
translation can be misleading.
Rendering some of the semantic range of “-warah” as “body” is problematic 
because the latter has connotations of individuality and wholeness in European 
languages, whereas the former is essentially a relational concept. In Kanamari, 
explains Costa, “the ‘body’ is only referred to as ‘-warah’ when it expresses a 
relation of dependence”: it designates “the torso in relation to its extremities,” 
or “the body as a whole (i.e., trunk, limbs, head, etc.) when conceptualized 
in relation to other bodies that are derived and/or dependent on it” (p. 62-63). 
This quote may imply an evolution of Costa’s interpretation of his data, since 
he had, in an earlier publication, given examples of a much more “individual” 
meaning of “-warah” as “body” (“wiri-warah” being, for instance, translated 
as “the living body of any peccary”, or “Poroya-warah” as “Poroya’s body”, 
Costa 2010, p. 171-172), whereas I have not noticed similar examples in his 
book (although it seems to be the case when people are ill and when the soul 
risks becoming separated from the body, p. 74). He could perhaps have better 
conveyed his point by talking of the “trunk-owner,” insofar as “trunk” implicitly 
always implies a contrast with the branches (of a tree) or limbs (of a body).
However, I think that such neologisms are unnecessary. It is obviously crucial 
to pay close attention to language, but Costa risks falling into a kind of lexical 
and morphological fetishism, which induces him to infer patterns of thought 
directly from the analysis of language. To stick to “-warah,” I am convinced 
that, with the evidence he provides, it is impossible to claim that: “‘body,’ 
‘owner,’ and ‘chief’ are imperfect glosses for what, in the Kanamari language, 
is one concept” (p. 2, see also Costa 2010, p. 172). In fact it is perfectly possible 
to translate the word according to the context: “Poroya-warah” may refer to 
the “owner” of Poroya (e.g. the foster mother who feeds him, if he is a child), 
or maybe to Poroya’s body (if we follow Costa’s earlier article). In a realistic 
linguistic situation in which complete utterances are made in context, it would be 
clear whether one is referring to an owner or to a body, which is why I believe 
it is meaningless to translate the word as “body-owner” in both cases. What 
Costa does is almost comparable to translating the English “chair” into French 
as “président-chaise” (or in Portuguese as “presidente-cadeira”), in order to 
stress that in some contexts “chair” can refer to a piece of furniture and in others 
to a person. We could play the same game with “head” referring both to a body 
part and to a hierarchical position. There is obviously a link between both uses, 
and it might be interesting to discuss its cultural implications, but it precisely 
requires plenty of evidence (especially of a diachronic nature) and a careful 
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discussion. I would have been more persuaded by the more modest claim that 
“-warah” stands for relations that are homologous but not strictly identical.
The consequences of Costa’s assumption are sometimes benign and sometimes 
the source of important shifts in meaning. I fear that the latter is the case when 
he articulates the cosmological underpinnings of regional organization. Costa 
draws a contrast between relations across the Juruá River—between the Kulina 
and the Kanamari, who are equivalent types of people—and relations along the 
Juruá—the “Dyapa”, upriver, are pure enemies, and white people, downriver, 
are partners in “calculated exchange” (p. 208-209). While convinced by this 
picture, I did not agree with all the steps of his argument. In myth, Kanamari and 
Kulina both originate from the seeds of a tree, whereas the Dyapa come from 
its trunk. Yet, from the fact that the trunk is “-warah” in relation to the seeds, 
is Costa right to conclude that the Dyapa are the “body-owners” (-warah) of 
the Kanamari? The Kanamari and Kulina may originate from seeds according 
to myth, but they are not, by themselves, seeds. The shift from a botanical to 
a socio-political relation happens surreptitiously between p. 198 and p. 207, 
without receiving any further justification than this lexical equivalence.
As Costa draws direct conclusions from linguistic features, he struggles to 
account for some seemingly anomalous elements. This especially clouds his 
discussion of the distinction between ownership and possession, which is a 
reformulation of the classic contrast between legal rights and physical control.7 
In Costa’s words: “‘Ownership’ designates a constitutive relation, one in which 
both the (body-)owner and that which is owned are defined via the relation. 
They do not exist as such outside of it. ‘Possession’ designates a contingent 
relation, one in which the possessor and the possessee exist independently of 
the relation. It is extrinsic to them” (p. 76). To give a very simple example of 
my own, having a child is what makes me a parent, and I cannot really sever 
this relationship, at least not in the way I can give away an object or sell a 
chicken. Moreover, ownership is a source of “magnification” of the person 
(to follow an idiom used both by Fausto [2008] and Taylor [2009]), since the 
owner is enriched by such relations. This distinction is pivotal, and enables 
Costa to highlight very important differences in the way people relate to other 
entities (whether people, animals, things, etc.). For instance, as I have already 
mentioned, the Kanamari “own” their pets but merely “possess” livestock; 
and they may “possess” (or “have”) sugar, but the “owners of sugar” are the 
shopkeepers (p. 79, n. 18).8
7. This is why property is often said to be a relation between persons with regard to things 
rather than a direct relation between persons and things, as possession (a direct control over 
something) would be.
8. My examples also point to two slightly different acceptations of the word, the latter more 
categorical (shopkeepers in general are the owners of sugar in general), implying a general 
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My problem is with Costa’s attempt to deduce this distinction from the lin-
guistic constructions for alienable and inalienable possession. He foregrounds 
this distinction (p. 65sq), even though it seems to fit his data very imperfectly. 
For instance, while characterizing inalienable possessions as a “condition for 
being a magnified person”, he acknowledges that body parts are “grammatically 
inalienable possessions” (and “even inanimate things inalienably possess parts 
of themselves”) whereas “alienable possessive constructs” apply to shamanic 
spirits and ritual songs (p. 67-69). However, most Amazonian anthropologists 
would consider that the latter are much more important than the former in 
processes of magnification. Similarly, having claimed that “-warah” is “one 
concept,” Costa is at pains to account for some heterogeneous uses of the 
word—and one may question whether it is the same word at all and not mere 
homophony. While “-warah” designates primarily an owner in relation to what 
is owned, “warah” can also be used as a verb meaning “to have” in general 
(as possession rather than ownership, p. 75-77), and “warah” is a noun that 
refers to Western merchandise (which Kanamari people “possess” rather than 
“own,” p. 78).9 The explanations offered by Costa are often tortuous. Even more 
crucially, I didn’t feel that it was the most relevant question he could ask of his 
ethnographic material. I was impressed by his analysis of how the Kanamari 
deal with livestock in comparison to pets and how this shapes their relation with 
neighbouring white people, but did not particularly care that they used the same 
word (or a word sounding similarly) for a constitutive relation of ownership 
and a type of merchandise that can merely be possessed. It might be worthy of 
investigation, but it does not always provide a decisive key of interpretation, 
especially when our knowledge of the language is still in progress.10
association, and the former more singular (so-and-so is the owner of this individual pet), 
implying an interpersonal relation. Both meanings could be included under what Benveniste 
calls “belonging” (appartenance) in contrast to “possession” (1966 [1960], p. 196-197), in 
his very careful study of their linguistic expression across a range of languages, whereas 
“ownership” steers the translation towards the more interpersonal meaning of the term.
9. At least Costa believed his informants when they told him that “wara” (to be born) 
was a completely different word, but he could not resist the urge to provide a hypothetical 
etymology linking it to “-warah” (p. 105, n. 4)! Those are different acceptations that he 
had downplayed in his 2010 article.
10. Questions of vocabulary orient Costa’s research on other occasions, for instance when 
he asks: “Why are subgroups named using a word that designates an enemy of all of them?” 
(p. 197). “X-dyapa” is the structure of the names of subgroups (with X a particular name) 
and “Dyapa” refers to the enemies of the Kanamari. On several occasions, without being a 
linguist and therefore claiming any competence to judge, I was not particularly convinced 
by Costa’s etymologies—but I did not find them necessary to his argument either. See, for 
instance, his etymology for “to feed” as “to cause need” (p. 25-26).
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This tendency sometimes gives The owners of kinship the appearance of a 
phrasebook compiling typical sentences about ownership and possession.11 
We hardly ever know in what context people utter such or such a sentence, to 
whom, with what intention and what effect, and it often seems that Costa draws 
on very general discussions he had with his informants. It comes as a pleasant 
surprise when he provides a detailed story or an account of naturally occurring 
dialogues—and there is such material in his book, for there is no doubt that he 
has conducted fruitful fieldwork. Nonetheless, it is as if he had intentionally 
thinned down his data in order to build a philosophy out of vocabulary.
As a consequence, Costa often ends up producing what I almost consider to 
be a “jural” concept of ownership, in spite of his claims to the contrary. He 
writes, for instance, that “having a body-owner makes one a person, being 
a body-owner makes one a magnified person” (p. 70, see p. 134 and p. 223 
for similar statements), since “having a body-owner” means having been fed 
and having relatives, while “being a body-owner” means having dependants. 
By formulating the question in such a general and abstract way, he describes 
ownership as if it defined objective conditions and rigid statuses according to 
cultural laws, even if those laws remain implicit until an anthropologist spells 
them out. But this view seems to be contradicted by his own remarks. First, 
he has stressed on several occasions that ownership is essentially a relational 
concept. It is probably possible to ask with respect to a pet a general question 
such as: “has it an owner?,” for instance to distinguish it from an animal that 
would belong to “the community” (p. 41), or maybe about a shamanic spirit, 
but I doubt it makes sense to formulate similar questions about a child (who 
is fed) or an adult (who lives in a settlement led by a chief). Moreover, it is 
probably impossible to formulate an abstract question such as “is he an owner?” 
Here, in a sense, Costa should have paid more attention to appropriate uses of 
the word, and I think it would have shown that it is always a matter of owning 
particular entities—whether people, animals, or spirits.
Second, Costa also notes that “father and mother are called -warah contextu-
ally, in light of certain events” (p. 122), or that “[r]eferences to the subgroup chief 
depend on contextual cues” (p. 144). One could agree that he had to leave out 
some contextual variations in order to make the concept intelligible, but I believe 
that this actually distorts the concept—or rather his depiction of “asymmetrical 
relations.” Costa tells us very little about actual situations of interlocution and 
merely notes, for instance, that adults engage in reciprocal relationships, “which 
elide the earlier asymmetrical bonds of dependency” (p. 123). It would be 
11. A similar comment could be made on the first sections of Brightman’s article on 
property relations in Guianese Amazonia, although he recognizes that “the relationship 
between language and thought is problematic, and that between language and society is no 
less so” (2010, p. 141).
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interesting to know more about those contextual variations, in order to establish 
whether they concern only lexical choices or whether it is the relation that is 
eclipsed or obviated in some situations—even more so since there are always 
multiple relations of ownership that overlap. It is probable (and in line with 
Costa’s analyses) that such variability affects children and followers more than 
pets and shamanic spirits: if highlighting a pervasive “relational schema” is a 
good way of showing that life is not partitioned in given spheres or domains, it 
might also downplay differences between actual instantiations of the schema. 
This question is crucial when it comes to the ownership of people, and Costa, 
for instance, says that: “Parents are owners of the children they feed” (p. 15), 
without ever describing what this ownership entails in terms of claims or 
rights. It is possible to express the same concern regarding other works on the 
topic. Brightman, for instance, states that “Trio and Wayana human persons 
[…] constitute one form of property” (2010, p. 152), challenging McCallum’s 
(2001) claim that relations between parents and children are not comparable to 
relations between persons and things. But it is not very clear whether he refers 
to the Akuriyo who were kept in dependence by some Trio and Wayana, to the 
chief who exercises “a form of ‘ownership’ or ‘mastery’ over the villagers” 
(ibid., p. 148), or to kinship. Challenging the (Western) opposition of subject and 
object should not automatically lead to the assumption that all beings constitute 
“property” in the same way, and some lexical equivalence is not enough to say 
that children are the property of their parents. It would require a study of the 
control that the latter may have (or not) over the former’s labour, sexuality, and 
reproductive capacities, mobility, etc., or what Brightman, Fausto, and Grotti 
(2016, p. 19) formulate as the “claims” that people have on others.12
Costa is well aware that there are important variations in ownership, yet while 
he tries to incorporate them in his analysis of the concept (they add “semantic 
density,” p. 52), he is not very interested in how they work out in practice. He 
could probably argue that my alternative formulations are already present in his 
work, but that he adopted another focus. Yet I would precisely like to question 
his general orientation or purpose. Costa wants to elucidate an Amerindian 
concept, as stated in his introduction, and does so through a study of native 
language—and of local terms in particular.13 Obviously, we can argue that this 
is integral to the anthropological project of understanding others in their own 
terms, and Costa specifically quotes Evans-Pritchard about the importance of 
12. In this recent paper, Brightman, Fausto, and Grotti retain the aim of challenging the 
dichotomy between persons and things, but want to study “rights in things, persons, and 
so forth” in general—what they refer to as “ownership” (rather than property)—and they 
stress that such rights are often “convoluted” (2016, p. 6, 20).
13. In his earlier article, Costa offers a definition of “-warah” and adds: “The remainder 
of the article will be a demonstration of this definition” (2010, p. 172).
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determining “the meanings of a few key words” (Evans-Pritchard 1962, p. 80, 
quoted p. 2). I have reservations about Costa’s interpretation of this quote. Evans-
Pritchard defines this as “the most difficult task in anthropological fieldwork,” 
upon which “the success of the whole investigation depends” (ibid.), yet he 
never dissociated this concern with translation from a study of practices, of 
life as something that is (and can only be) enacted rather than merely thought 
and imagined. Conversely, Costa describes and analyses Kanamari concepts 
almost as if they existed by themselves, probably because they provide him 
with the original contribution he aims to make to the academic community, and 
he seems to give detailed examples only as illustration. Similar debates have 
already taken place on many occasion—for instance with Lévi-Strauss’s (1950, 
p. xlvi) discussion of native and anthropological concepts or with Bourdieu’s 
(2000 [1972]) discussion of theoretical and practical activity—, and I fear that 
our doom is to replay such discussions forever. Yet it may also be a blessing 
for anthropology to keep on welcoming diverse and sometimes opposed ten-
dencies, and Costa’s book certainly has the great merit of providing innovative 
interpretations that will fuel current debates about native Amazonia.
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